TRINITY MINDS

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There is no such thing as a characteristic Trinity Mind. For almost seven hundred years, there have been minds that contain the spirit of the place occupied by Trinity College. And the spirit of a place contains the spirit of the times. The genius loci of a university reflects and refracts the Geist of the Zeit. The intellectual history of Trinity College is an integral part of the general history of a particular civilisation.

Founded in the thirteenth century, the University of Cambridge was the product of a series of intellectual revolutions extending over a period of almost two thousand years, originating in ancient Greece and ancient Israel. The medieval universities of Europe reflected a new intellectual flourishing over the course of several centuries, culminating in what has been called a twelfth-century renaissance.

In 1318, petitioned by King Edward II, the Pope recognised Cambridge University (*universitas cantabrigiensis*) as a *studium generale*, an approved institution of higher education. (The *universitas oxoniensis* was not so blessed.) In 1317, Edward had established in Cambridge a Society of the King’s Scholars (*scolares regis*). In 1337, his son Edward III established the King’s Scholars as a Hall - *aula scolarium regis*, shortened to *aula regis*, or The King’s Hall. It was financed under eleven successive monarchs (until 1546) from the royal Exchequer.

It has been suggested that the King’s Hall was the first university college in the modern sense - a residential establishment with fellows and graduates and undergraduates, and with a tutorial system of academic and personal supervision of the students. Between 1317 and 1352, perhaps attracted by the royal presence in the University, seven more colleges were founded in Cambridge, including Michaelhouse (1324). In 1546 the King’s Hall and Michaelhouse became Trinity College.

The King’s Hall, cradle of public servants, and Michaelhouse, a private foundation by Hervey de Stanton for the education of clerics, provided what the society of fourteenth-century England needed from higher education. The King and the Church were the pillars of the established social order. But it was a society in which the very idea of higher education contained the seeds of social change.

In subsequent centuries, there would be a series of revolutions – social, political, religious, legal, scientific, technological, artistic, and intellectual – epochs in the unceasing process of human self-evolving. People whose minds have contained the spirit of the place occupied by Trinity College have played a significant part in those transforming events.
In the early fourteenth century, English society was at last consolidating itself in a national identity on the basis of a complex fusion of its cultural origins – Greco-Roman, Christian, Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Norman-French. Anglo-Saxon English, Latin and a local version of French were coming together to form a new language of exceptional richness.

In 1362, at the request of the merchants of the city of London, Parliament passed a statute, itself written in Anglo-French, requiring that pleadings and judgments in all courts in England should be in English, since French ‘is much unknown in the said realm’. In the early days of the King’s Hall the teaching was in Latin. Outside the classroom, the King’s Scholars were permitted to speak French, the language of the ruling class.

By the later fifteenth century the King’s Hall had lost its position as the largest college in the University. For a brief period, from 1446 until he was deposed in 1461, Henry VI seemed determined to make the King’s Hall into a mere adjunct of his new Eton College-King’s College nexus (both founded in 1441).

Henry of Lancaster returned from refuge in France and defeated Richard III, the last of the Plantagenet kings, at the Battle of Bosworth Field in August 1485, taking the crown as Henry VII, the first of the Tudors. He brought with him from France Christopher Urswick, his chaplain and confessor, a former Fellow of the King’s Hall. Three months later Henry appointed Urswick as Warden of the King’s Hall, reasserting its independence from Henry VI’s college.

Urswick was typical of an age in which intense activity in the public life of the country - at the highest levels of government and diplomacy and in the Church – could be combined with scholarly involvement in the intellectual effervescence of Renaissance humanism. Urswick gained a tenuous immortality by appearing, almost imperceptibly, in Shakespeare’s *Richard III*.

Cuthbert Tunstall, Fellow of King’s Hall (1496-1500), is another instance of the same phenomenon. He had studied in Italy and came to be regarded as one of the most influential of English humanist scholars. But he also held leading positions in the church and in government and carried out special diplomatic missions, not least on behalf of the formidable Cardinal Wolsey.

John Fisher was a brilliant student at Michaelhouse from 1483 and became a Fellow in 1491. He was appointed as Master in 1497, at the age of 28. He was made Vice-Chancellor of the University in 1501 and Chancellor in 1504. He was made Bishop of Rochester in 1504 and Cardinal in 1534. He was executed on Tower Hill in 1535. He was canonised in 1935, saint and martyr.

At Michaelhouse Fisher came under the influence of a remarkable group of scholars, not least his tutor William Melton, a fellow Yorkshireman. Melton’s library, listed in his will, is a snapshot of the new pan-European Christian-humanist culture, in which Greek and Latin and Hebrew were the international languages of high culture.

Fisher was chaplain and confessor to the Lady Margaret Beaufort, mother of Henry VII. Through his powerful position in Cambridge and his personal connections
Fisher was able to play a crucial role in helping to establish Cambridge as a leading European university. He encouraged Margaret Beaufort to found Christ’s College and St John’s College in Cambridge and to endow Lady Margaret readerships (later professorships) of divinity in both Oxford and Cambridge.

He brought Desiderius Erasmus, the great Dutch Christian humanist, to Cambridge as a visiting scholar at Queens’ College. Erasmus, who was also a close friend of Thomas More, described Fisher as ‘saintly and learned’. His religion was conservative. He inspired, if he did not ghost-write, King Henry’s treatise against Luther, *Assertio septem sacramentorum* (An Assertion of the Seven Sacraments) (1521), causing Pope Leo X to confer on the King the title of *fidei defensor*.

Fisher was a firm supporter of Catherine of Aragon and a firm opponent of the King’s divorce from Catherine and his marriage to Anne Boleyn. He refused to take the oath acknowledging the issue of Henry and Anne to be legitimate heirs to the throne. Like Thomas More, he was condemned to death.

Like Erasmus and More, Fisher was a leading member of the new class of highly educated Christian humanists facing the devastating personal and intellectual challenge of the institutional and doctrinal disintegration of Christendom. It is moving to witness the mental turmoil of another such scholar, John Redman, ‘the most learned and judicious divine’, struggling to find a new intellectual coherence. Redman was the last Warden of the King’s Hall and the first Master of Trinity College.

King Henry’s removal of the institutional presence of Roman Christianity had been the easy part. English Catholics had been speaking out against the corruption of the Roman Church since Wycliffe and the Lollards in the fourteenth century. Monarchs throughout Europe had struggled for centuries with the intrusive power of the Papacy, not least in relation to the appointment of bishops. From time to time, the Pope had excommunicated kings and, in 1209, the whole kingdom of England.

Medieval political philosophy, which would supply the sources of modern political philosophy, was vigorously stimulated by discussion of the nature of the sovereignty of the emerging monarchies in relation to the jurisdictional claims of the Papacy. The Act of Supremacy of 1534 excluded all Papal jurisdiction from England and made Henry the ‘supreme head of the Church in England’. As the Church in England was gradually transformed into the Church of England, it would take much time and effort to decide what sort of a Church it would be, proclaiming what sort of Christianity. The competing institutional and doctrinal forms of Protestantism in northern Europe, especially Lutheranism and Calvinism, could not be ignored. Specific and painful choices had to be made.

Even on his deathbed in London (1551), John Redman was begged for answers by Dr Young, a Fellow of Trinity, who recorded his words. Pressed to give his view on the question of the nature of the presence of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine, Redman finally said that Christ is really (*vere*, in Latin) present – ‘we receive Him in our minds and souls by faith’.

In 1545, King Henry had procured an Act of Parliament for the dissolution of the university colleges, which had been spared from the dissolution of the abbeys and
monasteries. But people of influence in the universities and at court, and not least his wife Katherine Parr, hastened to do what people of influence are expected to do. They exercised influence. Queen Katherine told friends in Cambridge that, in her opinion, the king ‘being such a patron to good learning’ would ‘rather advance and erect new occasion therefor’ than get rid of the colleges. Henry appointed two commissions to look into the matter, consisting of three leading officials of the two universities, including John Redman, Warden of the King’s Hall and friend of Katherine Parr. We may not be surprised that they advised against dissolution. On the contrary, what the colleges needed was more money and better organisation.

Ecclesiastical revolutionary and doctrinal conservative and Christian humanist, and public sinner larger than life, King Henry may have seen a last opportunity favourable to the redeeming of his troubled soul in founding sister colleges at Oxford and Cambridge. Cardinal College, Oxford, was re-born as Christ Church. The King’s Hall and Michaelhouse were re-born as Trinity College. The King’s Letters Patent (19 December 1546) dedicated the College to the Holy and Undivided Trinity, declaring that it was to be a college of literature, the sciences, philosophy, good arts, and sacred theology – that is, the new humanist agenda for higher education. It was to be called ‘Trynitie College…of Kynde Henry the Eights Fundacion.’ The King died on 28 January 1547.

In official documents in the 1330’s, Edward III had called the King’s Hall ‘our college at Cambridge’. It is his royal standard, with its French fleurs de lys redolent of the Hundred Years War, that the college still raises above the Great Gate, formerly the gate of the King’s Hall. Mary and Elizabeth, the daughters of Henry VIII – the half-Spanish and very Roman Catholic Mary and the more English and less Roman Catholic Elizabeth - both contributed to the building of the new Chapel which was almost complete by the time of Elizabeth’s state visit to Cambridge in 1564. In documents relating to that enterprise, they both referred to ‘our new college in Cambridge called Henry the Eighth’s College’. During a visit to the College by Queen Victoria, the Master (Whewell) asked whether the Queen would like to take a rest in ‘my house’ (the Master’s Lodge). The Queen corrected him: ‘my house’.

It is a strange fact that it was at Trinity College in 1571 that a first volley was fired in an unholy holy war that would have big consequences – a Puritan exodus to settlements in North America, a civil war leading to the execution of a king and a short-lived theocratic Cromwellian republic, the restoration of a monarchy which would display Roman Catholic tendencies, leading to the removal of another king in the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the determining by Parliament of the succession to the throne (the Act of Settlement of 1701) subject to conditions, including those set out in the Bill of Rights of 1689.

In 1571, John Whitgift, Master of Trinity College, contrived to have Charles Cartwright dismissed from the Lady Margaret Professorship of Divinity and deprived of his Trinity fellowship. Whitgift became a forceful Archbishop of Canterbury, present at the deathbed of Queen Elizabeth, placing the crown on the head of James I. Cartwright became the relentless leader of the Presbyterian opponents of the establishment of the Church of England.
Whitgift and Cartwright clashed over two perennial theological problems which had become crucial issues in the making of Reformation Christianity throughout Europe. Is personal salvation pre-determined by God? Do we have the power to determine freely our actions, independently of the will of God? But the *casus belli* was also institutional. For the Presbyterians, the Reformation had been designed to remove the corrupt hierarchical structure of the Roman Church, with its bishops owing allegiance to the Bishop of Rome known as the Pope.

It seemed that the English Church, under the leadership of Whitgift, was now reproducing the same thing in a structure of bishops under the ultimate authority of the monarch as Supreme Head of the Church in England. The title was changed under Elizabeth to Supreme Governor of the Church of England. The word ‘head’ had seemed to imply that the monarch, like the Pope, was part of the Church hierarchy.

Whitgift was the cause of a profound long-term unintended consequence. He commissioned Richard Hooker (of Corpus Christi College, Oxford) to write a scholarly defence of the integration of the Church of England in the English constitutional structure. Hooker did so at great length in his *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1593). Hooker’s amalgam of the best of medieval theology and political philosophy and the best of English constitutionalism fed directly and powerfully into the mind of John Locke (of Christ Church, Oxford) whose ideas were used to explain and justify the constitutional anomalies of 1688-89 – the Glorious Revolution - and to inspire and guide the making of the United States of America.

Six Fellows of Trinity were members of the team of scholars who created the masterpiece of English literature that we call the King James Bible of 1611. Their pragmatic instructions told them to use, so far as possible, five existing translations. Some of the most familiar and beautiful passages in this new Authorised Version were taken from those earlier translations.

John Winthrop entered Trinity College in 1602 during Thomas Nevile’s magnificent architectural transformation. Not for the last time, the college must have seemed like a permanent building site. His father was the annual auditor of the college accounts. John married, for the first time, at the age of seventeen and could not continue as a student. Later he said that the universities - ‘the fountains of learning and religion’ - had become corrupt and too expensive for students of modest means.

Winthrop became a charismatic leader of the Puritans of East Anglia, the region that provided a remarkable number of those who made the exodus to America. The Puritans had seen a threat of counter-Reformation in what seemed to be a Romanizing tendency in the Church of England led by William Laud (Bishop of London from 1628; Archbishop of Canterbury from 1633), enforcing High Church doctrinal and liturgical orthodoxy.

The House of Commons showed signs of resisting the Laudian movement, and Charles I accordingly dissolved Parliament in 1629. Needing money, he recalled Parliament in 1640. An obscure and haphazard civil war followed, opposing so-called Parliamentarians and Royalists. The tinder had been religion; but it was a conflict that reflected more general social transformations.
In 1629 Winthrop convened a meeting in Cambridge of potential sponsors of a self-governing settlement in Massachusetts. While still in England he was elected as the first Governor of Massachusetts. He preached a sermon to his ship’s company of future colonists, which included John Cotton, a close friend from Trinity. His sermon has resonated throughout American history to the present day. ‘For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a Hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.’

His use of the familiar New Testament image (Matthew 5:14) came to be seen as epitomising America’s special destiny. John Cotton also preached a still-quoted sermon to the emigrating group. They were, he said, such as ‘dream of perfection in this world’. The Puritan exiles declared themselves to be loyal members of the Church of England, apostles of a purified Anglicanism. Cotton was the grandfather of Cotton Mather, whose name is associated with the Salem Witchcraft Trials (1692) and whose vigorous teaching ushered in an eighteenth-century American religious revival, the first Great Awakening.

Winthrop was re-elected as Governor several times. In 1636 the General Court of Massachusetts decided to establish a ‘school or college’. It was to be located at Newtowne which, in 1637, was renamed Cambridge in honour of the place where many of the leading colonists had studied. The college was renamed Harvard College (1639) in honour of John Harvard, an alumnus of Emmanuel College, Cambridge (founded in 1584 as a Puritan college) who had provided Harvard College’s first main private endowment. Its first President (at the time called ‘Schoolmaster’) was another Trinity graduate, Nathaniel Eaton, who ruled the college controversially and was removed (1639). Its third and much respected President (1654-72), Charles Chauncy, had been a Trinity undergraduate and Fellow.

If Winthrop’s attachment to his college had been closer, Harvard College might well have been called Trinity College. Adam Loftus evidently felt more warmly towards his college. Archbishop of Armagh, Archbishop of Dublin, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, he was one of a small group who obtained from Queen Elizabeth a charter (1592) establishing a university for Ireland. Loftus became the first Provost of Trinity College Dublin. Charles Perry, Senior Wrangler, Smith’s Prizeman, Fellow of the College, first Bishop of Melbourne, was one of the founding sponsors of Trinity College, the first college of the University of Melbourne (1872), and of Geelong Grammar School (1855).

Edward Coke left Trinity in 1570 and was called to the Bar (Inner Temple). He became a major actor in the great constitutional transformations of the first decades of the seventeenth century which would determine the whole future of the British constitution and of other constitutions inspired by the British constitution.

Coke was, at different times, a member of all three organs of the constitution – the House of Commons (Speaker in 1593), the government (Attorney-General, acting as a servant of the king as much as of the courts), and the judiciary (Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas). The significance of this fact is that Britain’s evolutionary constitutionalism would be organised, from then until now, as a trilectical struggle among the three focuses of ultimate public power.
Locke and Montesquieu and the makers of the American constitution of 1787 would recognise that the fine-tuning of the checks-and-balances among the organs of government (legislative, executive and judicial) is the great challenge of constitution-making and in the everyday organic life of a democratic constitution.

The rise of the Inns of Court in the fourteenth century was a fundamental and almost fortuitous factor in the making of the specific character of the English legal system. The post-1066 immigrant Norman-French ruling class had had the wisdom to allow the powerful inheritance of Anglo-Saxon customary law to co-exist with their own imported law, making possible a level of legal and administrative integration exceptional in Europe.

The medieval European universities, including Cambridge, taught the Civil Law, derived from Roman law, and Canon Law, the law of the Roman Church – sophisticated legal systems which would condition the social development of many Continental European countries and of the Roman Church itself. But practising lawyers in England learned their law and practice in the guild-like Inns of Court in London, specialising in an ingenious form of customary law, which came to be called the Common Law, a nation-wide legal system, within which the British constitution was secreting its mysterious substance. When the instant-law of parliamentary legislation began to appear in the fourteenth century, its relationship to judge-made law was uncertain. Was it merely a codifying or modifying of customary law? And what was the status of law made under the inherited royal prerogative?

Coke, in his role as a relentless judge and in his immense work of legal scholarship, including a massive series of law reports, affirmed a decisive principle. The relationship of all forms of law must be determined finally in the courts. This idea became a fundamental principle of liberal democracy, a principle which we now call the Rule of Law. All public legal power is ultimately subject to the law as determined and enforced by the courts.

Francis Bacon left Trinity in 1575 and was called to the Bar (Gray’s Inn). Thomas Jefferson said (1811) that Bacon, Newton and Locke were ‘my trinity of the three greatest men the world had ever produced’. Jefferson cannot have had in mind Bacon’s legal career which was as scintillating as Coke’s and also included an intellectual effort to bring order to the morass of English law. However, as Lord Chancellor, he was impeached and convicted of bribery. His charming defence, which he did not present to the House of Lords committee in person, having told them that he was not well enough to attend their deliberations, was that the bribes had not affected his judgments. He was removed from his public offices (1621).

Trinity had been useful for Bacon. It had taught him to despise what he called ‘professory learning’ whose practitioners ‘resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance’. For the young Bacon, the Cambridge mind had been corrupted by an Aristotelianism filtered through the medieval scholarly mind to form an arid and useless intellectualism. For the mature Bacon, the task was to take up again the intellectual challenge of the ancient Greeks – ‘a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon proper foundations’.
Baconism, a distinctly British form of humanism, had an important effect on the Continental European mind in the eighteenth century. It impressed Voltaire, who purported to idolise Bacon, Newton and Locke, using and overusing them in his devastating criticism of the old regime in France. Diderot and d’Alembert paid tribute to Bacon (‘one of England’s foremost geniuses’) as a primary inspiration of their *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (1751-72), a monumental work of the French Enlightenment, ordering all human knowledge in a new spirit of free-thinking. The Bacon-Locke-Berkeley-Hume axis of British philosophy awakened Continental philosophers from what Immanuel Kant called ‘dogmatic slumbers’. He dedicated his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/87) to Bacon.

Baconian humanism is not merely, or primarily, about the method of the natural sciences. It sets out a universal intellectual principle. Tradition and authority and convention are not sufficient grounds of truth. After the intellectual convulsions of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the time had come for an intellectual revolution led by the Baconian watchwords of truth and utility, treating Reason as a force of mind rather than a source of truth. ‘From a natural philosophy pure and unmixed,’ Bacon said laconically, ‘better things are to be expected.’ Even he could not have foreseen the amazing achievements of the natural sciences.

In the last decade of the seventeenth century, Charles Montagu, a close Trinity friend of Isaac Newton and sometime Fellow of the college, played a part in another kind of revolution. England had been seen as a country of ‘great wealth’ (the first Venetian ambassador, 1497) and London as a ‘mighty city of commerce’ (a German royal visitor, 1592). Britain was now leading the way into a new form of capitalism, with the accumulation of personal wealth, a market economy, industrialisation, flourishing urbanism, energised by an ancient spirit of intense individualism. It was giving birth to a new kind of human society, even a new kind of human being.

The financial system lagged far behind. Montagu, later first Earl of Halifax, was a lord of the Treasury from 1692 and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1694. A Bank of England was established under the Bank of England Act 1694, creating a sound basis for paper money. The Bank, using moneys originally subscribed by private investors against the hypothetical security of receipts from taxation, lent money to the government – the beginning of the National Debt, the Consolidated Fund, and government borrowing in general. A real power of Parliament over the public finances, as opposed to theoretical claims of the so-called supremacy of Parliament, had been established. The masters of the British economy were now materially committed to the post-1688 constitutional settlement.

So far as the Baconian intellectual revolution was concerned, it was not to be in the two English universities that it found its primary focus. With adherence to the Church of England a requirement for the holding of university and college offices in England (until 1871), the creative intellectual energy of those excluded from the universities went elsewhere. It went to the Royal Society, the Salomon’s House of Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis splendidly realised, in which Trinity minds have played so great a part. It went to the kind of people who formed the Lunar Society and who were often religious non-conformists or dissenters and included masters of brilliantly inventive engineering. Above all, the new spirit went to the Scottish universities,
doing what the English universities should have done in higher education and scholarship, developing the boundless intellectual legacy of the seventeenth century.

Seventy years after Nevile’s great work, the genius loci of Trinity College was disturbed again. Isaac Barrow - first holder of the Lucasian Professorship in Mathematics, Master of the college (1672-77), and a theologian with an unusually benign view of human nature - was a man of robust character. He resigned the professorship to allow Isaac Newton to be appointed, at the age of 27. A meeting of the University central body rejected his proposal for a stately building, at least as good as that at Oxford, for ceremonial occasions. He was ‘piqued at this pusillanimity’ and, that very afternoon, marked out the foundations of a building ‘more magnificent and costly’ than the building he had proposed to the University.

His friend Christopher Wren designed a library inspired by Jacopo Sansovino’s Library of Saint Mark’s in Venice. Wren’s matchless building, the formal lawns and peripheral planting and cheerful fountain of Great Court, the cloistered calm of Nevile’s Court, and the green oasis of the Fellows’ Garden, reflect an ancient aesthetic ideal of lucidus ordo, a product of mind acting in conjunction with nature, which Trinity minds contain as a lifelong spiritual possession. In the luminous ante-chapel, beneath the loquacious clock, six Trinity minds embodied in marble tell us that thought defeats time.

Richard Bentley was Master of the college from 1700 until 1742 or, more strictly speaking, until 1721 when he was removed from the mastership by the Bishop of Ely as Visitor, following protracted legal proceedings, including proceedings in the High Court, stemming from what some Fellows saw as his high-handed abuse of his magisterial power. Ignoring his dismissal he remained in the Lodge until his death.

Bentley arrived from London with a public reputation for combative scholarship. A Trinity tradition of classical scholarship continued from Bentley through Porson and Jebb to Housman and Cornford in the twentieth century. Leading classical scholars seem to see themselves as scholarchs, laying down the law imperiously on matters of scholarship. Housman said: ‘I wish they would not compare me with Bentley…Bentley is alone and supreme.’ Of a translation by the apparently omniscient Benjamin (‘it isn’t knowledge if he doesn’t know it’) Jowett, Master of Balliol College, Housman said: ‘the best translation of a Greek philosopher which has ever been executed by a person who understood neither philosophy nor Greek’.

The relative passivity of the two universities in the eighteenth century had a surprising incidental effect on the general development of British social life. Britain would be a land of connoisseurship. Not least at Trinity, which included among its undergraduates an exceptional number of the sons of the most privileged social classes, the youths studied, however superficially, the literature of Greece and Rome. They peppered their writings and their speeches in Parliament with Latin and Greek quotations and allusions. They travelled to the European Continent, sometimes with a college Fellow as cicerone, learning to admire the splendid remains of ancient Greece and Rome and the new achievements of European art and architecture inspired by the Greek and Roman examples.
With this higher education in pan-European taste they formed the desire to create reservoirs of great beauty, in their town-houses and on their estates in the country, and in museums – for example, in the Fitzwilliam Museum magnificently endowed by the seventh Viscount Fitzwilliam (1816), who had been an undergraduate at Trinity Hall. Although the British might not be able to equal the best Continental masters in the fine arts and music, they became connoisseurs and sponsors and consumers of high culture to a degree unsurpassed in Europe.

George, sixth Baron Byron, came to Trinity (1805) with a romantic family story – Norman immigrants, soldiers with Edward III at Calais and with Henry VII at Bosworth Field; a Scottish maternal grandfather descended from James I. His significance in the transformation of European consciousness exceeded even his own self-dramatising. Byron challenges Nietzsche’s designation of Rousseau as the first modern man. Rousseau’s self-exposing correspondence has been edited, and published in fifty-two volumes, by a Fellow of Trinity, R.A. Leigh (1915-87).

There is a link between Byronism and Baconism. The intense individualism and passionate subjectivity of Romanticism in the arts and literature meant that a new basis had to be found not only for knowledge but also for morality, religion, and social order. Tradition and authority and convention were no longer enough. To his contemporaries throughout Europe, Byron seemed to embody energising ideas of liberty, personal and social, the profoundly ambivalent legacy of eighteenth-century Enlightenment and Revolution. Giuseppe Mazzini, a progenitor of modern Italy, said: ‘the day will come when Democracy will remember all that it owes to Byron’. The frenzy of the modern world had begun.

By 1800 British constitutionalism had been transformed. In the relative constitutional calm of the eighteenth century, important features of the modern constitution – cabinet government, a Prime Minister, party politics, public opinion – had emerged organically out of a miasma of structural and opportunistic corruption. By the end of the century Britain found that it had absent-mindedly acquired a worldwide empire and negligently lost the American colonies.

The intelligent Elizabethan religious settlement had saved the country from the religious wars that ravaged much of northern Europe and delayed social progress. The constitutional settlement cobbled together at the end of the seventeenth century had liberated the creative and energetic classes of society, fatally undermining ossified political and social structures which persisted in many other European countries.

After the Europe-wide trauma of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, it seemed to some that ‘there is a feeling, becoming daily more general and confirmed...in favour of some undefined change in the mode of governing the country’ (Robert Peel, the Tory, writing in 1820). Others spoke of a possible ‘British Revolution’ (Francis Place, the radical, writing in 1830).

The peaceful establishment of a new social order saved Britain from the social turbulence of so many Continental European countries in the nineteenth century. The Duke of Wellington, Napoleon’s nemesis, standard-bearer of the old order, called it revolution by process of law. Two Trinity minds played a significant part in the first stages of that process. In 1832, under Earl Grey as Prime Minister (1830-34), the
Reform Bill, reforming elections to the House of Commons, finally ended its dramatic passage through Parliament. The Abolition of Slavery Act 1833 ended the institution of slavery in the British Empire, a reform that, like the abolition of the slave trade (1807), responded to a grass-roots movement in public opinion.

Earl Grey shares with two other Trinity minds – the fourth Earl of Sandwich and Henry Rolls – the distinction of having useful products named in their honour – a tea, a snack food, and a motor car respectively.

Thomas Macaulay left his Trinity prize fellowship in 1826 and was called to the Bar (Gray’s Inn). Elected to Parliament in 1830 at the age of 30, he made the most influential speeches in the Commons debates on the Reform Bill. He characterised the question of the reform of Parliament as a struggle between the young energy of one class and the ancient privileges of another. It was time to bring the legal order of society into harmony with the natural order. To oppose reform was to go against the spirit of the age - a phrase then much in vogue. And the spirit of the age was, above all, the spirit of the new world-transforming industrial age.

Macaulay told the House of Commons to remember that English history is a story of the natural progress of society towards liberty. He used this tendentious argument in support of the abolition of slavery and the removal of the civil disabilities of Catholics and Jews. It was a recurrent theme of his historical writings. Like Voltaire and Hume, he seemed to treat history-writing as a form of national self-imagining which is useful in the task of managing social change.

Macaulay’s enthusiasm for social progress had a spectacular world-historical consequence. In 1835 he went to India as the legal member of the Supreme Council of India. Official British India was beset by a dramatic struggle about the future of education in India. Macaulay immediately lent his formidable rhetorical force to the side of the Anglicists, led by Charles Trevelyan, his future brother-in-law, who wanted Indian education to be conducted in English with an essentially English curriculum, as opposed to the Orientalists who wanted to retain the existing form of education conducted in the Indian languages with a curriculum reflecting the diverse religious cultures of India. It was a struggle about the whole future of India.

Writing in 1835 Macaulay was crudely dismissive of the merits of the cultures of India and spoke lyrically of the achievements of Western civilisation. Only a progressive English-speaking India could take an effective part in the future of the world. The Anglicists won the battle. Whatever judgment one may make of the decision and its consequences for the people of India, it is good that Trinity minds would include minds from India, from the rest of the Empire and Commonwealth and, with the rise of English as a universal language, from the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, Lord Melbourne, a Trinity Prime Minister (1834, 1835-41) succeeding another Trinity Prime Minister, shared his Trinity mind with the mind of the young Queen Victoria. In affectionate tête-à-têtes he told her about the nature of British politics and the mysteries of the British constitution. R.A. Butler (Master, 1965-78) would share his unrivalled experience of government with the young Trinity mind of Prince Charles, Prince of Wales.
In the two ancient English universities the great nineteenth-century march of progress was a thing of fits and starts. After parliamentary commissions of inquiry and much vigorous debate, the universities began to converge with the very new world, teaching all the necessary scholarly disciplines at the college level and now, at last, with lectures and libraries and laboratories at the university level.

Pivotal and emblematic in the transformation of the universities was the remarkable William Whewell (Master, 1841-66) - ‘science his forte, omniscience his foible’ – according to the irreverent cleric Sydney Smith.

Whewell ruled the college remotely and pugnaciously. He occupied his mind with everything from mineralogy to moral philosophy. Using the new words ‘scientist’ and ‘physicist’, he proposed a philosophy of the inductive sciences (1840) that seems close to the everyday understanding of the matter among scientists themselves. Philosophy of science was central to the work of C.D. Broad, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy (1933-53), who was also prominent in a Trinity speciality, the serious study of paranormal psychic phenomena.

Whewell founded and endowed the Whewell Professorship and Scholarship in International Law, having himself produced an English translation of one of the foundational treatises of International Law, *De iure belli ac pacis* (1625) by Hugo Grotius. In the tradition of Nevile and Barrow, he added substantially to the college buildings, at his own expense.

God was a problem for the nineteenth century. Defying Nietzsche, God was certainly not dead. Religion was still refuge and strength for many people throughout the century. For others it had become a focus of anguished doubt, Evangelical seriousness struggling with itself. The writer George Eliot, translator from the German of two of the most influential religion-troubling books (Strauss’s *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, 1835; Feuerbach’s *The Essence of Christianity*, 1841), articulated that troubled state of mind. As told by F.H. Myers, a Fellow of the college and her host on this occasion, she had a moment of sombre clarity (c. 1868) in the avenue in the Fellows’ Garden. ‘God, Immortality, Duty…how inconceivable [is] the first, how unbelievable the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third.’

Religion had provided an answer to the problem of evil raised by the Book of Genesis. If you could no longer accept the religious answer, what other possible basis could there be for morality? In the nineteenth century, the philosophical market was flooded with possible strategies for putting morality back on a sound basis.

As Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy (1838-55), William Whewell published his own treatise on moral philosophy – as did three other powerful Trinity minds: William Clifford, mathematician, moral philosopher, and philosopher of consciousness; Adam Sedgwick, Woodwardian Professor of Geology; and Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy from 1883. Sidgwick and Eleanor Balfour, whom he married in 1876, played a leading part in the founding of Newnham College, of which Mrs Sidgwick was the second Principal (1892-1900). She was a sister of Arthur Balfour, whose Trinity mind would be the intellectually serious mind of a Prime Minister (1902-05) and Foreign Secretary (1916-19).
Balfour’s Gifford Lectures, published as *Theism and Humanism* (1915), influenced the thinking of C.S. Lewis.

Under the influence of Whewell, a Moral Sciences Tripos was introduced in 1851, a small event with a vast cultural background.

Immanuel Kant had defined ‘enlightenment’ (1784) as the emergence of the human mind from its self-imposed immaturity. Organised rationalism would now achieve, in the name of Bacon’s watchwords of truth and utility, what tradition and authority and convention had failed to achieve. Bacon’s *radius reflexus*, the beam of light that the human mind focuses on itself, would at last allow us to see ourselves clearly. Human progress would be a programme and no longer merely an aspiration.

Auguste Comte, French intellectual leader in the field, proposed to discover ‘the essential laws of human nature’. Saint-Simon, his mentor, had proposed (1813) *la science de l’homme* (human science), using a method analogous to that of the natural sciences, with the human world being seen as also manifesting the phenomenon of *causation*. Comte called the new movement *positivism* (1840) and gave the name *sociology* (1847) to a new intellectual discipline. In his *System of Logic* (1843) J.S. Mill discussed the prospects of what he called the *moral sciences*.

For Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom the problem of mankind’s moral pathology was a lifelong obsession, the only possible solution was for mankind to surpass itself by fashioning a new kind of human being, an *Übermensch*. A Trinity mind, Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin and a human scientist of the scientific kind, suggested that selective breeding might be used to make better human beings.

To understand better the inherited human condition might help in making a better human future. In the new spirit of scientific historiography, Frederic Maitland created the modern discipline of British legal history. His groundbreaking work on the legal and economic development of medieval English society, and on the history of British constitutionalism, provided a rich source for the study of Britain’s long-term social history and for understanding socio-economic modernisation in general. His most influential book was published (1895) with Frederick Pollock, a former Fellow, as co-author. Pollock, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, was a close life-long friend of the remarkable U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Pollock set the pattern of writing for the study and teaching of law in universities.

It may seem improbable that a small group of friends meeting mostly in rooms in Nevile’s Court in the first decade of the twentieth century could convince themselves that they had found the answer to the problem of moral philosophy, a conviction that would have significant social consequences.

Those present might include George Edward Moore, Lytton and James Strachey, John Maynard Keynes and E. M. Forster (both from King’s College), Clive Bell, Thoby Stephen, Leonard Woolf, Bertrand Russell, Desmond MacCarthy, and George Trevelyan who became an influential historian in the style of Thomas Macaulay, his great-uncle, and Master of the college (1940-51). The friends were joined, on her frequent visits from London, by Virginia Stephen, Thoby’s sister who, in 1912, married Leonard Woolf.
Some of the friends were members of the Apostles, a Trinity-centred discussion society founded in the 1820’s in conformity with the poet-philosopher Coleridge’s idea of a *clerisy* of the most intellectually advanced people who would, it was supposed, redeem the world from its moral imperfections.

G. E. Moore, a Fellow of the college since 1898, was a dominant presence in the group. It was he who had, so it seemed, solved the eternal problem of moral philosophy. He was a philosopher who had briefly been tempted by a British form of the German idealism of Kant and Hegel taught, in particular, by John McTaggart at Trinity and by F.W. Bradley at Oxford. Moore taught a form of ethics (*Principia Ethica*, 1903) in which our intuitive capacity to interpret an ideal of the good can regulate our personal life and, especially, our relationships.

His ideas had a powerful effect on all those who came in contact with him. In taking those ideas to the wider world, including the rather narrow world of Bloomsbury, his friends promoted a version of Moore’s philosophy which Moore himself might not have recognised—a form of moral and aesthetic subjectivity which seemed to be a refined hedonism. Lytton Strachey had done much to dethrone Victorian values. His brother James brought into Britain a new spirit of the age contained in the writings of Sigmund Freud.

His Trinity mind was psychoanalysed by Freud himself in Vienna. He became general editor of the twenty-four-volume Standard Edition (in English) of Freud’s works. It was Strachey who, controversially, used the Latin words *Ego*, *Super-ego*, and *Id* to translate Freud’s German terms *Ich*, *Über-Ich* and *Es*.

Moore was certainly no hedonist. To Bertrand Russell he seemed to have ‘a kind of exquisite purity’. Russell claimed to have caused Moore to tell the only lie he had ever told. Russell: ‘Moore, do you *always* tell the truth?’ Moore: ‘no’.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was brought to Cambridge by Russell. His mind became, formally at least, a Trinity mind. Russell and A.N. Whitehead, Fellows of the college, had proposed a philosophy of mathematics (*Principia Mathematica*, 1910-13), identifying the fundamental mathematical principles that make mathematics possible.

Now Wittgenstein proposed a philosophy of philosophy, identifying the fundamental philosophical principles that make philosophy possible, and hence the principles that set a limit to the possibility of philosophy. It was part of a wider enterprise (logical positivism), with its main focus in Wittgenstein’s native Vienna, which applied the demystifying scientific spirit of Comteian positivism to philosophy itself, that is, the mind thinking in the most general terms about its own activity.

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (published in 1921; the only book he published in his lifetime) was submitted as his Ph.D thesis, with Moore and Russell as his examiners, giving Moore an opportunity for gentle donnish humour in his examiner’s report. ‘It is my personal opinion that Mr Wittgenstein’s thesis is a work of genius; but, be that as it may, it is certainly well up to the standard required for the Cambridge degree of Doctor of Philosophy.’
Later, Wittgenstein recognised what he called ‘grave mistakes’ in his book. His thinking moved in a new direction which would be reflected in a posthumous book (Philosophical Investigations, 1953) prepared for publication by others. The earlier book had been in the line of a sceptical tradition as old as Western philosophy, arguing that most of the so-called problems of philosophy, including the notorious problems of moral philosophy, are false problems. They are caused by the tendency of philosophers to suppose that any idea which has a substantive name (truth, justice, evil, duty, matter, spirit, the soul, the self, and so on) can be discussed using the kind of language that we use to discuss things present in material (supposedly non-mind-made) reality. However, the apparent substantiality of such ideas is nothing more than a mind-made linguistic illusion. Philosophy ceases to be possible when we cease to use language as a means of representing non-mind reality.

‘What we cannot speak about,’ Wittgenstein said forbiddingly in the last sentence of the Tractatus, ‘we must pass over in silence.’

His second book reflects a recognition that a philosophy of philosophy should concern itself with all the different purposes which language serves, without prescribing or proscribing any particular kind of use. An idea that had been present in the first book became the central idea of the new book.

The mind thinks and speaks in different languages, as it were. Philosophy, itself a use of language, does not claim to lay down rules about the validity of the use of language in different forms of thinking and speaking, whose difference is precisely designed to incorporate different rules of validity – describing an event, postulating scientific hypotheses, uttering religious beliefs, making moral judgments, giving orders, expressing emotion, writing poetically. Chess and draughts are rule-governed board games; but there are not rules governing the validity of moves in both games.

It is the job of philosophy to investigate the ways in which the mind uses rule-governed language to express its mind-made ideas, listening to the voices of the human mind with the third ear of philosophy. Wittgenstein’s early death (in 1951, at the age of 62) prevented him from taking further these more accommodating ideas.

James Frazer spent almost all his academic life at Trinity. The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic and Religion (1890-1915), his vast work of descriptive and comparative anthropology (twelve volumes in the third edition), suggested to some people that all religions, including Christianity, are miscellaneous permutations of perennial and universal mythic materials. T.S. Eliot said (1922) that Frazer’s Golden Bough ‘has influenced our generation profoundly’. It certainly influenced both Sigmund Freud in his probing of the unconscious individual mind and Carl Jung in his daring hypothesis of a collective unconscious mind of the human race.

With the apparent collapse of capitalism in the 1930’s and the failure of democracy in several countries, some people began to look for an alternative social system. The problem was that the obvious alternative system was Marxist communism; but something purporting to be Marxist communism was being enacted in the Soviet Union in a ruthlessly totalitarian form. J.K. Galbraith, waiting for Keynes, excoriated free-market capitalism. Maurice Dobb and Piero Sraffa treated
Marxian economics with scholarly seriousness. Some Trinity minds even treated the Soviet Union itself with a perverted form of loyalty, with dire consequences.

Edward Hallett Carr certainly took the Soviet Union seriously. He published a *History of Soviet Russia* in fourteen volumes. He had been a diplomat from 1916 to 1936. Like Maynard Keynes and the Trinity historian J.R.M. Butler, he had been a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference which produced the Treaty of Versailles (1919), a searing experience. As Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University of Aberystwyth, and as a Fellow of Trinity, he was a leader of a ‘realist’ school of international studies, treating relations between states as a ruthless struggle of competitive power.

Bertrand Russell’s radical mind was not deceived either by Stalinist Russia or by the rhetoric of the Cold War. In the tradition of Bacon and Macaulay, he spoke directly to the public mind, in favour of causes ranging from opposition to the First World War in 1916 to nuclear disarmament in the 1960’s. His mind combined the analytical mind of the philosopher with a burning moral intensity.

In 1945 the world changed fundamentally. Trinity College’s deepest roots are in a nation emerging into the new civilisation of the fourteenth century, a nation and an institution that would live through seven centuries of evolutionary change. Now a new world is emerging, presaging some kind of unstable and uncertain global civilisation. The human mind must respond yet again to new existential challenges.

The function of a university is to generate ideas at the highest level about the natural world and the human world, and to share those ideas with succeeding generations of young minds. It is a function which is more crucial than ever in the making of the challenging new world of the twenty-first century.

We may be tempted to find ground for hope in the fact that, through seven centuries, minds affected by the spirit of this particular place have practised an unspoken trinitarian faith – a belief in the power of the human mind, in the power of the human mind to change the world, in the power of the human mind to make a better world.